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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
In this private securities fraud class action under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 
two institutional investors allege a pharmaceutical company 
and its executives made materially false and misleading 
statements in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the “Exchange Act”) regarding interim clinical trial 
data related to the development of an experimental 
Alzheimer’s drug.  The District Court granted defendants’ 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  We will 
affirm.1 
I. 
Plaintiffs-appellants City of Edinburgh Council as 
Administering Authority for the Lothian Pension Fund and 
Arca S.G.R. S.p.A. (the “Funds”)2 bring suit on behalf of a 
class of investors who purchased Wyeth, Inc. common stock 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
2 Security Police and Fire Professionals of America 
Retirement Fund, a lead plaintiff below, is not a party to this 
appeal. 
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between May 21, 2007, and July 29, 2008 (the “Class 
Period”).  The Funds allege Wyeth and four former Wyeth 
executives—defendants Robert Essner, Bernard Poussot, Jr., 
Kenneth J. Martin, and Robert R. Ruffolo, Jr.—made 
materially false and misleading statements regarding the 
development of the experimental Alzheimer’s drug 
bapineuzumab.  Defendant Pfizer Inc. is the successor-in-
interest to Wyeth, which it acquired in 2009. 
 
The Funds bring three claims:  (1) securities fraud 
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 
and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b-
5; (2) control person liability under section 20a of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t; and (3) insider trading under 
section 20A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a).3 
 
A. 
Approximately 5 million Americans and 26 million 
people worldwide suffer from Alzheimer’s disease.  Wyeth 
and Elan Corporation, plc (“Elan”),4 an Ireland-based 
pharmaceutical company, embarked on a joint venture to 
                                              
3 Because the District Court granted defendants’ Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we assume the Funds’ well-
pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations to be true.  See 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).  We may 
consider documents incorporated into the complaint, 
Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 252 
(3d Cir. 2009), and take judicial notice of SEC filings, Oran 
v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 289 (3d Cir. 2000). 
4 Perrigo Company plc acquired Elan in 2013. 
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develop an Alzheimer’s treatment that, unlike other drugs 
then on the market, would target the underlying causes of the 
disease.  This joint venture produced bapineuzumab, which is 
designed to treat mild to moderate Alzheimer’s.  As required 
by Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulations, 
Wyeth and Elan launched clinical trials to assess the efficacy  
and safety of bapineuzumab in treating Alzheimer’s.5  In 
2006, Wyeth and Elan completed Phase 1 trials of 
bapineuzumab and received Fast Track status from the FDA.6  
Before announcing Phase 1 results, Wyeth and Elan began the 
                                              
5 FDA regulations require three phases of clinical trials—
which may overlap—to assess the efficacy and safety of 
potential new treatments.  21 C.F.R. § 312.21.  Phase 1 tests 
the drug’s efficacy and safety on a small number of patients.  
Phase 2 is a controlled clinical study in which various doses 
of the drug are tested on groups of up to several hundred 
patients to evaluate preliminary indicia of the drug’s efficacy 
and safety.  Phase 3 studies—randomized, multicenter trials 
on large patient groups over an extended period—aim to 
provide sufficient evidence of efficacy and safety to support 
FDA approval to market the drug. 
 
6 Fast Track status entitled the companies to priority oversight 
from the FDA, including an accelerated path to approval and 
more frequent communications with the FDA.  See Fast 
Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval and 
Priority Review, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forpatientadvo
cates/speedingaccesstoimportantnewtherapies/ucm128291.ht
m (last visited June 4, 2014).  Only drugs intended to treat 
serious or life-threatening diseases for which there is a 
significant unmet medical need qualify for Fast Track status. 
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Phase 2 trial, a controlled, double-blind study designed to 
measure the efficacy of bapineuzumab compared to a 
placebo.  The companies measured bapineuzumab’s efficacy 
using two tests, the Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale-
Cognitive (“ADAS-cog”) and the Disability Assessment 
Scale for Dementia (“DAD”). 
 
The Phase 2 trial was not scheduled for completion 
until 2008, and Wyeth and Elan said they did not expect to 
release any Phase 2 trial data until that time.  The focus of the 
Funds’ complaint is a joint press release issued on May 21, 
2007 (the “May 2007 Release”), announcing the companies’ 
decision to initiate a Phase 3 clinical trial, subject to FDA 
approval, in the second half of 2007.  The May 2007 Release 
stated (emphasis added): 
 
Elan . . . and Wyeth . . . today announce the 
decision to initiate a Phase 3 clinical program 
of . . . Bapineuzumab. . . .  This decision was 
based on the seriousness of the disease and the 
totality of what the companies have learned 
from their immunotherapy programs, including 
a scheduled Interim look at data from an 
ongoing Phase 2 study, which remains blinded.  
No conclusion about the Phase 2 study can be 
drawn until the study is completed and the final 
data are analyzed and released in 2008.  Phase 
3 clinical trial design will be finalized with 
regulatory agencies, and subject to regulatory 
approval, it is intended for the trial to begin in 
the second half of 2007.   
The Funds contend that at the time Wyeth issued the May 
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2007 Release the company knew—but did not disclose—that 
the Phase 2 interim results did not support the decision to 
initiate the Phase 3 trial.7  The Funds’ two confidential 
witnesses8 allege the interim results showed bapineuzumab 
had failed pre-specified criteria for efficacy and revealed 
serious adverse safety risks.  Wyeth disputes this allegation, 
arguing the Phase 2 results showed “statistically significant 
and clinically meaningful benefits” among an important 
patient subgroup—non-carriers of the Apolipoprotein E4 
(“ApoE4”) gene who are believed to make up 40 to 70 
percent of Alzheimer’s patients, or approximately 2 to 3.5 
million Americans.  Further, Wyeth contends CW1’s 
statements confirm its interpretation of the subgroup data—
CW1 noted the Phase 2 interim results were “interesting” and 
“warranted further testing” with regard to non-carriers of the 
ApoE4 gene but only as an additional Phase 2 trial, not as a 
Phase 3 trial.  And Wyeth notes it had to obtain FDA 
                                              
7 The Funds also allege defendants Martin and Ruffolo 
profited from the concealment of the poor Phase 2 interim 
results by exercising and selling stock options on May 22, 
2007. 
8 The Funds’ confidential witnesses are former high-ranking 
Wyeth executives who performed extensive work related to 
the development of bapineuzumab during the Class Period.  
Confidential witness 1 (“CW1”) was a member of Wyeth’s 
Neuroscience Steering Committee and Bapineuzumab 
Steering Committee.  Confidential witness 2 (“CW2”) was a 
member of Wyeth’s Research and Development (“R&D”) 
Committee.  The confidential witnesses provided their 
evidence through affidavits. 
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approval to initiate the Phase 3 trial,9 on which the companies 
spent “millions of dollars of their own assets.” 
 
The Funds also argue the May 2007 Release was 
misleading in light of a prior statement made on October 5, 
2006, by defendant Ruffolo, Wyeth’s head of research, at the 
company’s annual meeting for securities analysts.  Ruffolo 
stated orally that the companies planned to conduct an interim 
review of the Phase 2 results at the end of 2006 in order to 
determine whether and how to proceed to a Phase 3 trial: 
 
Now, again, we don’t have any results from this 
[Phase 2] study at all, but we have a planned 
interim look at the data at the end of the year.  
And, based on this interim look, we could do 
two things.  One, depending on the data, we 
could advance directly into Phase III in the first 
half of 2007, but the results would have to be 
spectacular.  We don’t know what results we’re 
going to get.  Alternatively, we could complete 
the study and then move to the next interim 
look, which would be in the first half of 2007.  
                                              
9 The FDA approves a Phase 3 trial, which typically includes 
far more subjects than a Phase 1 or Phase 2 trial, where there 
is “preliminary evidence suggesting effectiveness.”  21 C.F.R. 
§ 312.21(c).  But the FDA retains the ability to suspend a 
clinical trial through a clinical hold, id. § 312.42, or to 
terminate a clinical trial if there is “convincing evidence that 
the drug is not effective for the purpose for which it is being 
investigated” or the trial poses “an unreasonable and 
significant risk of illness or injury,” id. §§ 312.44(b)(1)(i), 
(b)(2)(i), (b)(2)(iii). 
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Despite defendants’ explicit warning in the May 2007 
Release that “[n]o conclusion about the Phase 2 study can be 
drawn” and that initiation of Phase 3 would be “subject to 
regulatory approval,” the Funds allege Ruffolo’s remarks led 
them to interpret the May 2007 Release’s statement that the 
Phase 3 trial would commence early based in part on the 
Phase 2 interim results to mean those results were 
“spectacular.” 
 
On June 17, 2008, Wyeth and Elan issued a press 
release (the “June 2008 Release”) disclosing “preliminary 
findings” from the Phase 2 study.  The June 2008 Release 
reported that the Phase 2 trial failed to meet its objectives as 
to the entire study population and reported serious adverse 
events among both placebo- and bapineuzumab-treated 
patients.  But it noted that based on “[p]ost-hoc analyses,” 
bapineuzumab showed “statistically significant and clinically 
meaningful benefits” among non-carriers of the ApoE4 gene 
who are believed to make up 40 to 70 percent of Alzheimer’s 
patients.  Accordingly, the June 2008 Release announced the 
companies’ conclusion that the results of the Phase 2 trial, as 
well as its safety findings, supported the decision to proceed 
with the Phase 3 trial.10 
 
On July 29, 2008, Wyeth and Elan revealed the Phase 
2 results through a joint press release, conference 
                                              
10 The Funds also alleged Wyeth and Elan committed 
securities fraud through factual omissions in the June 2008 
Release.  The District Court held the June 2008 Release was 
not actionable because defendants had no duty to disclose the 
allegedly omitted information, and the Funds do not challenge 
that determination on appeal. 
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presentation, and investor conference call.  Despite the 
disclosure in the June 2008 Release that the Phase 2 trial had 
failed to meet its overall objectives, the Funds contend 
investors only learned for the first time on July 29 that the 
Phase 2 trial was nearly a complete failure—the results 
showed no efficacy and revealed serious safety concerns.  
According to CW1, the final Phase 2 results did not differ 
significantly from the Phase 2 interim results referenced in 
the May 2007 Release.   
 
B. 
The District Court granted defendants’ first motion to 
dismiss on February 10, 2012, holding the Funds had not 
adequately alleged defendants made any materially false or 
misleading statements and defendants had no duty to disclose 
allegedly omitted details.  On December 21, 2012, the District 
Court granted the Funds leave to file a second amended 
complaint.  On April 22, 2013, the District Court again 
dismissed the Funds’ claims, holding (1) the Funds failed to 
adequately allege defendants made any affirmatively false or 
misleading statements, (2) defendants had no duty to disclose 
additional information about the Phase 2 interim results, and 
(3) the Funds failed to sufficiently plead a predicate Exchange 
Act violation required to maintain their control person 
liability and insider trading claims. 
   
On appeal, the Funds contend the District Court erred 
in dismissing their section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims for 
failure to adequately plead falsity.  The Funds also argue 
defendants’ statements and actions triggered a duty to 
disclose full and complete material information to investors 
about the Phase 2 interim results.  And the Funds challenge 
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the District Court’s dismissal of their control person liability 
and insider trading claims. 
 
We review de novo the District Court’s decision to 
grant defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  See In re 
Aetna, Inc. Sec. Litig., 617 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2010).  We 
also exercise plenary review over the dismissal of a complaint 
for failure to satisfy the heightened pleading standards of the 
PSLRA and over the District Court’s interpretation of federal 
securities laws.  Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 
564 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 2009).  The PSLRA’s heightened 
pleading standards require a private securities fraud complaint 
alleging false or misleading statements to “specify each 
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or 
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an 
allegation . . . is made on information and belief, . . . state 
with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1); see Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 321 (2007).  “This standard 
requires plaintiffs to plead the who, what, when, where, and 
how:  the first paragraph of any newspaper story.”  
Institutional Investors Grp., 564 F.3d at 253 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  A complaint must also 
“state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference 
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2); Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 321.  We must 
evaluate “the complaint in its entirety, as well as other 
sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss,” including documents 
incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of 
which we may take judicial notice.  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322 
(citation omitted). 
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C. 
This is not the first case in which the federal courts 
have adjudicated securities fraud allegations arising out the 
development of bapineuzumab.  Three federal courts have 
considered and dismissed claims similar to those at issue in 
this case.  See Kleinman v. Elan Corp., plc, 706 F.3d 145 (2d 
Cir. 2013); In re Elan Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 08-cv-8761 
(S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2011); Philco Invs., Ltd. v. Martin, No. 
10-02785, 2011 WL 500694 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010). 
 
In Kleinman, the Second Circuit affirmed the Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal of a suit against Elan, Pfizer, and two Elan 
executives for failure to allege any actionable false statements 
or omissions and failure to plead a predicate Exchange Act 
violation.  Kleinman, 706 F.3d at 147.  The plaintiff in 
Kleinman alleged the June 2008 Release misrepresented the 
Phase 2 results as “[e]ncouraging” and omitted key 
information about the lack of a dose response and analysis of 
the Phase 2 data.  But the Second Circuit rejected those 
contentions, holding the June 2008 Release clearly stated the 
“[e]ncouraging” results were subgroup results and finding 
words like “encouraging” to be puffery.  Id. at 153.  And the 
court found the omitted information claim was not actionable 
because, although possibly of interest to a reasonable 
investor, its omission did not render the June 2008 Release 
false or misleading.  Id. at 154–55. 
 
In In re Elan, a district court dismissed claims against 
Elan for failure to allege any actionable false statements or 
omissions.  The case challenged many of the same statements 
at issue in this case, including the May 2007 Release.  The 
court rejected the allegation that the May 2007 Release was 
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false based on Ruffolo’s “spectacular” statement.  Transcript 
of Argument at 10:9–13, In re Elan, Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 08-
cv-8761  (“There’s nothing about [the May 2007 Release] 
that says it’s going to be spectacular.  Everyone knows that in 
this business it’s extraordinarily risky and . . . expensive, and 
lots of drugs have been stopped in phase 3, even though they 
had high hopes in phase 2.”).  The court described Ruffolo’s 
“spectacular” statement as “puffery” and noted that the law 
does not provide that “an early puffery, if not corrected, 
continues to be a false statement every day of the year that 
follows.”  Id. at 15:20–23.  And the court said Elan and 
Wyeth would not have agreed to proceed to Phase 3, given 
the millions of dollars the companies spent, unless Phase 2 
showed at least some promising data.  Id. at 18:5–19. 
 
Finally, in Philco Investments, a district court 
dismissed claims against Elan and three of its executives for 
failure to adequately allege falsity and to plead a predicate 
Exchange Act violation.  Philco Invs., 2011 WL 500694, at 
*1.  Plaintiffs challenged both the May 2007 Release and the 
June 2008 Release.  The court found plaintiffs failed to allege 
Elan disclosed criteria by which it would judge the Phase 2 
interim results, and, accordingly, plaintiffs failed to 
adequately allege the May 2007 Release was false.  Id. at *6–
7.  The court also concluded plaintiffs failed to allege the 
June 2008 Release was false because, although it may not 
have included all the information a reasonable investor would 
have liked to have, it did not contain false or misleading 
information.  Id. at *7–9. 
 
II. 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the “use 
14 
 
or employ[ment], in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security . . . [, of] any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the [SEC] may prescribe.”  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).  SEC Rule 
10b-5 implements this provision by making it unlawful to, 
among other things, “make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading.”  17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5(b).  The Supreme Court has implied a private 
cause of action from the text and purpose of section 10(b).  
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 
(2011). 
 
To state a claim for securities fraud, plaintiffs must 
allege (1) a material misrepresentation or omission, 
(2) scienter, (3) a connection between the misrepresentation 
or omission and the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance 
upon the misrepresentation or omission, (5) economic loss, 
and (6) loss causation.  Id. at 1317–18; In re Aetna, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 617 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
The primary issue in this appeal is the first element, 
whether the Funds have adequately alleged defendants made 
a material misrepresentation or omission.  The District Court 
concluded the Funds had failed to do so.  But the Funds 
contend that conclusion was incorrect because the May 2007 
Release contained affirmatively false and misleading 
statements about the Phase 2 interim results, and defendants’ 
post-May 21 statements were also false or misleading.  We 
agree with the District Court. 
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A. 
We first analyze whether the May 2007 Release 
contained any affirmative false statements, and then we 
consider whether the May 2007 Release was misleading in 
light of defendant Ruffolo’s October 2006 “spectacular” 
statement. 
 
1. 
Specifically, the Funds allege one statement in the 
May 2007 Release was affirmatively false—the decision to 
initiate the Phase 3 trial “was based on the seriousness of the 
disease and the totality of what the companies have learned 
from their immunotherapy programs, including a scheduled 
Interim look at data from an ongoing Phase 2 study, which 
remains blinded.”  This statement was affirmatively false, the 
Funds contend, because Wyeth’s decision to move to Phase 3 
was not “based on” the Phase 2 interim results—it was made 
in spite of those results, which the Funds characterize as 
abysmal.  Because their confidential witness statements 
demonstrate bapineuzumab failed the interim review, the 
Funds argue the Phase 2 interim results did not support 
defendants’ decision to initiate Phase 3.11 
                                              
11 We apply the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements 
to confidential witness allegations “by evaluating ‘the detail 
provided by the confidential sources, the sources’ basis of 
knowledge, the reliability of the sources, the corroborative 
nature of other facts alleged, including from other sources, the 
coherence and plausibility of the allegations, and similar 
indicia.’”  Institutional Investors Grp., 564 F.3d at 263 
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We agree with the District Court, however, that the 
Funds’ allegations are insufficient to maintain a plausible 
claim of falsity regarding the May 2007 Release statement 
under the “[e]xacting pleading requirements” of the PSLRA.  
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 
308, 313 (2007); Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 
564 F.3d 242, 263 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The PSLRA imposes a 
particularity requirement on all allegations, whether they are 
offered in support of a statement’s falsity or of a defendant’s 
scienter.” (citation omitted)). 
 
The Funds’ own pleading demonstrates the accuracy of 
defendants’ statement that the initiation of Phase 3 was based 
in part on the Phase 2 interim results.  See Cal. Pub. Emps.’ 
Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 156–58 (3d Cir. 
2004) (finding plaintiffs failed to adequately plead falsity 
where information provided by their confidential witnesses 
was generally consistent with defendants’ allegedly false and 
misleading public statements).  Analyzing the phrase “based 
on” in the May 2007 Release under the PSLRA’s heightened 
pleading standards, the Funds have failed “to specify . . . the 
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading” because 
the most cogent interpretation of that phrase is that defendants 
considered the Phase 2 interim results as one factor in their 
decision to initiate the Phase 3 trial.  See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 
322.  The Funds’ confidential witness statements indicate 
defendants did analyze and consider those results in deciding 
whether to initiate Phase 3. 
 
Moreover, the Funds’ argument that the May 2007 
                                                                                                     
(quoting Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 
126, 147 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
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Release falsely conveyed that the Phase 2 interim results 
justified the initiation of Phase 3 fails because it is based on a 
selective reading of that document.  See id. (instructing courts 
to consider complaints under the PSLRA in their entirety, 
including documents incorporated by reference).  The May 
2007 Release made no statement about the strength of the 
interim results.  Instead, the May 2007 Release provided three 
bases for the move to Phase 3:  (1) the seriousness of 
Alzheimer’s disease, (2) the totality of what the companies 
learned from their immunotherapy programs, and (3) the 
Phase 2 interim results.  A full reading of the May 2007 
Release under the PSLRA’s heightened pleading 
requirements, therefore, bolsters the District Court’s 
conclusion that it contained no false statements.  See id.; In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (noting we are to examine statements in the full 
context of the documents of which they are part).  Most 
importantly, the May 2007 Release explicitly cautioned 
investors that “[n]o conclusion” could be drawn about the 
Phase 2 interim results until the completion of Phase 2. 
 
A comparison with the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Kleinman is instructive.  In that case, plaintiff challenged 
allegedly false statements in the June 2008 Release.  The June 
2008 Release, unlike the May 2007 Release, did make 
affirmative characterizations about the Phase 2 results—it 
described the Phase 2 results as supportive of the decision to 
initiate Phase 3 because of the “statistically significant and 
clinically meaningful benefits” shown for the ApoE4 non-
carrier subgroup.  But the Second Circuit concluded plaintiff 
had not alleged anything in the June 2008 Release was 
literally false because the references to “[e]ncouraging” 
results could not have meant anything other than the positive 
18 
 
subgroup results.  Kleinman v. Elan Corp., plc, 706 F.3d 145, 
153 (2d Cir. 2013).  Moreover, the Second Circuit held 
expressions such as “encouraging” constituted puffery.  Id.  
Because the May 2007 Release offers no affirmative 
characterization of the Phase 2 interim results, Kleinman 
supports defendants’ position that the May 2007 Release was 
not affirmatively false. 
 
Even reading the May 2007 Release as conveying the 
message that the interim results supported the move to Phase 
3 and assuming the truth of the Funds’ confidential witness 
allegations, the Funds’ allegations still fail to establish that 
defendants’ May 2007 Release statement was affirmatively 
false.  See Institutional Investors Grp., 564 F.3d at 263 n.33 
(noting that confidential witness allegations may be found 
adequately particularized under the PSLRA but may still “fail 
either to establish the falsity of a statement, or to give rise to a 
strong inference of scienter”).  The Funds’ confidential 
witnesses allege bapineuzumab failed the interim review 
because it did not achieve pre-defined p-values12 Wyeth used 
to assess the statistical significance of bapineuzumab versus a 
placebo under the ADAS-cog and DAD tests.  Specifically, 
CW2 alleges that unless the Phase 2 interim review met these 
specified p-values, Wyeth and Elan had agreed they would 
not proceed to Phase 3 based on the interim review.  CW1 
contends the Phase 2 interim results did not reveal any 
statistically significant difference between bapineuzumab-
treated patients and placebo-treated patients with respect to 
                                              
12 A p-value, or probability value, is a measure of statistical 
significance.  Relevant to the Funds’ allegations, the 
companies did not disclose that achievement of any particular 
p-values were necessary to initiate a Phase 3 trial. 
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any of the pre-specified efficacy endpoints measured by the 
ADAS-cog and DAD tests.  Nor did bapineuzumab show any 
“dose response,” meaning higher doses of the drug were not 
associated with better results.  Furthermore, the Phase 2 
interim results showed serious safety concerns with 
bapineuzumab, including numerous side effects and three 
deaths (compared to no deaths in patients treated with 
placebo). 
 
But the Funds point to no public disclosure by 
defendants of the specific p-values bapineuzumab was 
expected to achieve under the ADAS-cog and DAD tests, no 
public statements regarding a “dose response” or whether one 
would be expected, see Kleinman, 706 F.3d at 153–54, and no 
public comments about the safety metrics, including 
anticipated side effects, through which bapineuzumab would 
be evaluated.  Because defendants never told investors 
bapineuzumab would only pass the interim review if specific 
p-values, dose responses, or safety metrics were achieved, the 
Funds’ confidential witness allegations fail to establish with 
sufficient specificity that the challenged May 2007 Release 
statement—that the decision to initiate Phase 3 was based in 
part on the Phase 2 interim review—was false. 
 
Moreover, CW1 noted that the results showed 
“circumstantial evidence of efficacy” for an important patient 
subgroup—non-carriers of the ApoE4 gene—consisting of 
approximately 40 to 70 percent of Alzheimer’s patients.  
CW1 also stated that one of his superiors was upset about the 
decision to initiate Phase 3 testing and that the subgroup 
results justified further investigation through a Phase 2 
“exploratory” trial, not a large scale Phase 3 “confirmatory” 
trial. 
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These allegations show a difference of opinion within 
Wyeth about whether the Phase 2 interim results—together 
with the seriousness of Alzheimer’s disease and the totality of 
what the companies had learned from their immunotherapy 
programs—justified initiating a Phase 3 trial.  Interpretations 
of clinical trial data are considered opinions.  See Kleinman, 
706 F.3d at 153; In re Adolor Corp. Sec. Litig., 616 F. Supp. 
2d 551, 567 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  Opinions are only actionable 
under the securities laws if they are not honestly believed and 
lack a reasonable basis.  In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., 
Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 543 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 
2008); Kleinman, 706 F.3d at 153. 
 
The Funds have failed to adequately allege defendants 
did not honestly believe their interpretation of the interim 
results or that it lacked a reasonable basis.  A company’s 
failure to accurately disclose clinical trial data may be 
actionable under the securities laws, but the cases the Funds 
cite are distinguishable because they involve plausible 
allegations of affirmative false statements about a drug’s 
efficacy and safety.  See, e.g., In re Viropharma, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., No 02-1627, 2003 WL 1824914, at *6, *9 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 7, 2003); In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
319 F. Supp. 2d 152, 160 (D. Mass. 2004).  In contrast, the 
May 2007 Release contains no affirmative statement about 
bapineuzumab’s efficacy or safety.  Moreover, the initiation 
of Phase 3 cost millions of dollars and required FDA 
approval, rendering it improbable that defendants would have 
continued if they did not believe their interpretation of the 
interim results or if they thought the drug a complete failure.  
See Kleinman, 706 F.3d at 153. 
 
Moreover, because the Phase 2 interim results showed 
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“circumstantial evidence of efficacy” for one important 
patient subgroup, the disagreement of some Wyeth employees 
with the company’s interpretation of the interim results is not 
sufficient to show defendants’ interpretation lacked a 
reasonable basis.  The Funds present three pieces of evidence 
showing disagreement among Wyeth’s employees about the 
decision to initiate Phase 3.  CW2 noted that after 
presentation of the Phase 2 interim results to the company’s 
four-member Elan Alliance Committee and approximately 
100-member R&D Committee, he and two other members of 
the R&D Committee “expressed skepticism” at the decision 
to proceed with Phase 3 based on the interim results.  CW1 
revealed that one of his superiors was upset Wyeth decided to 
proceed, at Ruffolo’s urging, with a “massive” Phase 3 study.  
And CW1 noted his own belief that Wyeth should have 
conducted another Phase 2 study to investigate the subgroup 
results, not a Phase 3 trial.  But the disagreement of five 
employees within a large pharmaceutical company about the 
interpretation of clinical trial data and the critical strategic 
decision of initiating an expensive Phase 3 trial does not 
render defendants’ decisions unreasonable or their statements 
false.  See Kleinman, 706 F.3d at 153 (finding no basis for 
inferring defendants did not honestly believe their statements 
because the initiation of Phase 3 could only be made “after 
there have been positive Phase 2 results sufficient to satisfy 
both business and regulatory interests”); In re Adolor, 616 F. 
Supp. 2d at 567 (holding disagreements about the proper 
methodology and conduct of clinical studies are insufficient 
to establish falsity).  At bottom, the Funds fail to plead 
sufficient facts to show defendants did not honestly believe 
initiating Phase 3 was appropriate or that defendants lacked a 
reasonable basis for that decision. 
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2. 
We next evaluate whether the District Court correctly 
determined that the May 2007 Release was not misleading in 
light of defendants’ prior statements.  The Funds contend the 
May 2007 Release was misleading because defendant Ruffolo 
had assured investors in October 2006 that Wyeth would not 
commence Phase 3 early unless the Phase 2 interim results 
were “spectacular” in meeting specific efficacy criteria.13  By 
telling investors they were moving to Phase 3 early based in 
part on the Phase 2 interim results, the Funds contend 
defendants misled the market by failing to disclose those poor 
results, leaving the impression they must have been 
“spectacular” or at least positive.  The Funds argue this 
failure to disclose in fact misled the market, and they cite 
statements by stock analysts and point to the increase in 
Wyeth’s stock price following issuance of the May 2007 
Release. 
 
We agree with the District Court that defendants’ 
statements, taken in context, were not misleading.  The May 
2007 Release did not characterize or discuss the strength of 
the Phase 2 interim results.  It only listed those results as one 
factor among three in the decision to initiate Phase 3, and it 
expressly cautioned investors not to draw conclusions about 
the Phase 2 study until its completion.  The Funds’ attempt to 
differentiate between conclusions regarding the interim and 
final results is unavailing in light of the May 2007 Release’s 
                                              
13 Pre-class period statements may be used to ascertain the 
falsity and materiality of the challenged statements.  In re 
Merck & Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
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plain language.  Defendants’ explicit caution against drawing 
conclusions about the “Phase 2 study” by definition includes 
the interim results, which were part of the Phase 2 study. 
 
The Funds also appear to misread Ruffolo’s October 
2006 statement.  They interpret it to mean Wyeth would not 
commence Phase 3 early unless the Phase 2 interim results 
were “spectacular” in meeting specific efficacy criteria.  But 
Ruffolo’s statement was more narrow.  He noted the 
companies “could advance directly into Phase III in the first 
half of 2007” if the results were “spectacular” or could 
complete the study and then move to the next interim look in 
the first half of 2007.  As defendants correctly point out, the 
course of events Ruffolo envisioned in the “spectacular” 
scenario did not come to pass—the companies did not 
advance to Phase 3 in the first half of 2007.  Instead, the May 
2007 Release announced the initiation of Phase 3 in the 
second half of 2007.  Accordingly, the May 2007 Release 
should have superseded any lingering impression left by the 
“spectacular” statement in the minds of reasonable investors.  
See United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 170 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
Bolstering our conclusion is the nature of Ruffolo’s 
prior statement.  Ruffolo’s 2006 “spectacular” statement was 
a forward-looking statement about a course of events that, as 
it turned out, did not come to pass.  By using the conditional 
“could,” Ruffolo did not bind the company to any particular 
course of action.  Nor could he, because at the time he spoke 
initiation of Phase 3 still required FDA approval.  Moreover, 
the adjective “spectacular” is the kind of “vague and general 
statement[] of optimism” that “constitute[s] no more than 
puffery and [is] understood by reasonable investors as such.”  
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In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 538 (3d Cir. 
1999), abrogated on other grounds by Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007), as recognized in 
Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 276 
(3d Cir. 2009); see also Transcript of Argument at 15, In re 
Elan Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 08-cv-8761 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 
2011); Philco Invs., Ltd. v. Martin, No. 10-02785, 2011 WL 
500694, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011).  Furthermore, 
although the May 2007 Release did not offer any specific 
characterization of the Phase 2 interim results, it did caution 
that no conclusion could be drawn about the Phase 2 data 
until the completion of the study.  Had the interim results 
been “spectacular,” it is reasonable to assume the companies 
would have trumpeted that fact in the May 2007 Release—or 
at least given some indication the data were positive. 
 
Moreover, Ruffolo never said bapineuzumab was 
required to meet specific efficacy criteria to advance to Phase 
3.  That remark was made by Elan’s CEO at a January 9, 
2007, healthcare conference.  Defendants cannot be held 
responsible for statements they did not make.  See Schiff, 602 
F.3d at 168, 170–71.  Although the Funds’ confidential 
witnesses stated that bapineuzumab was required (and failed) 
to achieve certain p-values in Phase 2 and showed no dose 
response and numerous safety concerns, the Funds fail to 
allege any public statements by defendants regarding specific 
p-values, dose responses, or safety metrics bapineuzumab 
would be expected to achieve in order to advance to Phase 3. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude the District Court correctly 
determined the Funds failed to adequately allege defendants 
made any affirmatively false or misleading statements in the 
May 2007 Release. 
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B. 
The Funds also contend defendants made six false or 
misleading public statements following issuance of the May 
2007 Release.  The Funds allege these statements failed to 
disclose the efficacy and safety problems revealed in the 
Phase 2 study, as well as that the Phase 2 interim results 
showed bapineuzumab did not meet pre-established criteria 
and Phase 2 testing was nearly a complete failure.  We concur 
with the District Court and reject these allegations. 
 
The Funds first challenge defendant Ruffolo’s May 22, 
2007, remarks at the Citigroup Healthcare Conference.  When 
asked to discuss which aspects of the Phase 2 interim review 
justified the early initiation of the Phase 3 trial, Ruffolo said 
he “cannot comment and will not comment on the Interim 
look” because he “cannot do anything to destroy the blind in 
that study.”  Because Ruffolo only referred attendees to the 
May 2007 Release and refused to comment on how the 
interim review justified the initiation of Phase 3, he made no 
false or misleading statement. 
 
Next, the Funds contend statements made by Wyeth 
investor relations representative Justin Victoria and defendant 
Poussot during earnings calls on July 19, 2007, and April 22, 
2008, that described the Phase 2 interim results as one factor 
in the “composite decision” to move to Phase 3 were false 
and misleading.  But those statements are consistent with the 
May 2007 Release and accurately convey that the interim 
results were one factor defendants considered in deciding to 
initiate Phase 3.  Moreover, Victoria confirmed to investors 
and analysts on the April 22, 2008, call that Wyeth had not 
yet disclosed the strength of the Phase 2 results and needed to 
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complete the analysis of the Phase 2 data to make that 
determination.  As a result, we find the July 19 and April 22 
statements were not false or misleading. 
 
The Funds also challenge statements made by Wyeth 
executives Dr. Joseph Camardo and Joseph M. Mahady.  At 
the January 8, 2008, J.P. Morgan Healthcare Conference, 
Camardo described bapineuzumab as a potential 
“breakthrough” drug for Alzheimer’s, and at the March 19, 
2008, Lehman Brothers Global Healthcare Conference 
Mahady mentioned bapineuzumab as an example of a drug 
offering “opportunities for transformational growth of the 
company.”  But these statements are not actionable because 
they are vague, non-specific, and forward-looking.  See In re 
Advanta, 180 F.3d at 538; Philco Invs., 2011 WL 500694, at 
*6.  Both speakers were also cautious—Camardo noted the 
companies still faced risks establishing bapineuzumab’s 
efficacy and safety, and Mahady reminded the audience that 
the final results of the Phase 2 study were not yet available.  
Furthermore, Camardo’s statement that Wyeth and Elan 
“learned a lot in Phase II” is true based on the statements 
from the Funds’ own confidential witnesses.  Accordingly, 
the Funds’ allegations that these statements were false or 
misleading lack merit. 
 
Finally, the Funds allege defendant Poussot’s 
statements on Wyeth’s July 23, 2008, 8-K and earnings call 
were false and misleading because he described the Phase 2 
results as “encouraging and supportive of our prior decision 
to initiate Phase 3.”  Unlike the other post-May 21 statements, 
Poussot did characterize the final Phase 2 results as positive.  
But he only repeated conclusions Wyeth had disclosed six 
days before in the June 2008 Release.  The District Court held 
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the June 2008 Release was not actionable because defendants 
were under no duty to disclose information the Funds alleged 
was omitted from that document, and the Funds do not 
challenge that determination on appeal.  Accordingly, we 
concur with the District Court that because the June 2008 
Release is not false or misleading, Poussot’s statements 
cannot be the basis of liability here. 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold the District 
Court correctly determined the Funds failed to sufficiently 
allege defendants’ post-May 21 statements were false or 
misleading. 
 
III. 
 In addition to alleging defendants’ statements were 
affirmatively false or misleading, the Funds contend those 
statements triggered a duty to disclose full and complete 
material information regarding the Phase 2 interim results.  A 
duty to disclose under federal securities laws may arise when 
a statute requires disclosure, insider trading occurs, or there is 
an inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading prior disclosure.  
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 285–86 (3d Cir. 2000).  The 
Funds urge us to impose a duty to disclose on each of these 
grounds because (1) defendants chose to speak about a 
material subject to investors, (2) defendants Ruffolo and 
Martin allegedly engaged in insider trading, and (3) 
disclosure was necessary to make defendants’ prior 
statements not misleading.  We agree with the District Court 
that defendants were under no duty to disclose the allegedly 
omitted information. 
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A. 
The Funds first argue defendants had a duty to speak 
fully and truthfully about the Phase 2 interim results because 
they put the subject “in play” by discussing those results 
publicly.  Instead of concealing material information about 
the poor Phase 2 interim results, the Funds allege defendants 
should have either disclosed those poor results or admitted 
they had changed their criteria for initiating the Phase 3 trial.  
 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “do not create an 
affirmative duty to disclose any and all material information.”  
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 
(2011).  “Disclosure is required . . . only when necessary ‘to 
make . . . statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading.’”  Id. (quoting 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)).  “Silence, absent a duty to 
disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”  Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988).  “[C]ompanies can 
control what they have to disclose under these provisions by 
controlling what they say to the market.”  Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1322. 
 
The May 2007 Release made no affirmative statement 
about the strength of the Phase 2 interim results nor 
characterized those results in any manner.  See Oran, 226 
F.3d at 285 (finding no material misrepresentation or 
omission where defendants did not make any “affirmative 
characterization” that FDA approval was based on a complete 
review of all relevant medical information as alleged by 
plaintiffs).  Accordingly, Wyeth did not place the strength or 
nature of the Phase 2 interim results “in play,” so it was under 
no duty to provide additional details about those results.  
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Wyeth was also not obligated to disclose whether it had 
changed its criteria for initiating Phase 3, since that fact was 
likewise not “in play.”  Significantly, Wyeth never disclosed 
that particular p-values would have to be met in order to 
commence Phase 3.  Nor did it ever reveal the specific 
rationale or formula it was using to decide whether to initiate 
Phase 3. 
 
The Funds’ attempt to analogize this case to Matrixx is 
unavailing.  In Matrixx, the Supreme Court evaluated whether 
a drug company’s failure to disclose reports of a possible link 
between its product and anosmia, the loss of the sense of 
smell, rendered the company’s statements relating to revenues 
and product safety misleading.  Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1313–
14.  The company stated, among other things, that reports 
linking its product to anosmia were “completely unfounded 
and misleading” and that the safety and efficacy of the drug 
were well established.  Id. at 1323.  The evidence showed, 
however, that the company had documentation of a biological 
link between the drug and anosmia and had conducted no 
studies of its own to disprove that connection.  Id.  In finding 
the company’s actions rendered its statements misleading, the 
Court determined it was substantially likely a reasonable 
investor would regard the omitted information as material.  
Id. 
 
Here, by contrast, the central issue is whether the 
Funds have adequately alleged falsity, not materiality.  And, 
unlike Matrixx, the challenged statements in this case do not 
characterize or make affirmative claims about the Phase 2 
interim results.  The May 2007 Release noted only that Wyeth 
and Elan decided to initiate the Phase 3 trial “based on the 
seriousness of the disease and the totality of what the 
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companies have learned from their immunotherapy programs, 
including a scheduled Interim look at data from an ongoing 
Phase 2 study, which remains blinded.”  Subsequent 
statements only reiterated the May 2007 Release statement, 
discussed bapineuzumab’s potential to be a “breakthrough” 
drug for Alzheimer’s, and noted bapineuzumab as an example 
of a drug offering “opportunities for transformational growth” 
of Wyeth.  None of these statements characterized or made 
affirmative claims about the Phase 2 interim results.14 
 
Accordingly, Matrixx is inapposite to this case, and 
defendants did not have a duty to disclose additional 
information because they mentioned the Phase 2 interim 
results as one factor in their decision to initiate Phase 3. 
 
B. 
The Funds next argue defendants were under a duty to 
disclose because defendants Ruffolo and Martin allegedly 
engaged in insider trading.15  “[A] corporate insider must 
                                              
14 Defendant Poussot’s July 23, 2008, statement describing 
the Phase 2 results as “encouraging and supportive” of the 
decision to initiate Phase 3 did characterize the final Phase 2 
results.  But, as noted previously, this statement only repeated 
conclusions Wyeth had previously disclosed in the June 2008 
Release, which the District Court found was not actionable—
a determination the Funds do not challenge on appeal. 
15 Specifically, the Funds contend that on May 22, 2007, 
Ruffolo exercised options and sold 130,436 Wyeth shares at 
$58.33 per share, for a net gain of approximately $2.36 
million.  The same day, Martin sold 200,500 shares at $57.97 
per share, for a net gain of approximately $283,000.  By May 
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abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless he 
has first disclosed all material information known to him.”  
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980); 
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 506 (3d Cir. 
1988).  The Funds’ theory is Ruffolo and Martin knew the 
negative Phase 2 interim results, concealed them from 
investors, and reaped the benefit of that concealment by 
trading on Wyeth’s artificially inflated stock. 
 
But the Funds have failed to adequately plead an 
insider trading violation under section 20A of the Exchange 
Act because they have failed to adequately plead a predicate 
section 10(b) violation.  See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 
180 F.3d 525, 541 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other 
grounds by Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 
U.S. 308 (2007), as recognized in Institutional Investors Grp. 
v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 276 (3d Cir. 2009).  Section 
20A, which provides an express private cause of action for 
insider trading against contemporaneous traders, requires the 
alleged insider trader to have committed an independent 
violation of the Exchange Act or SEC rules and regulations 
promulgated under that law.  15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a).  The 
Funds have not adequately alleged that Martin and Ruffolo 
committed such an independent violation. 
 
Nor are the Funds’ insider trading allegations 
sufficient to meet the heightened pleading standards for 
scienter under the PSLRA.  The PSLRA requires the Funds to 
allege facts giving rise to a “strong inference” of scienter, 
which “must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it 
                                                                                                     
22, 2007, Martin had exercised every profitable option 
available to him. 
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must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing 
inference of nonfraudulent intent.”  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).  The mere 
fact that Martin and Ruffolo sold stock is insufficient to 
establish scienter.  See In re Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 
F.3d 137, 152 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 
(2007), as recognized in Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 
708 F.3d 470, 484 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
For these reasons, there is no duty to disclose based on 
alleged insider trading. 
 
C. 
The Funds also allege defendants had an ongoing duty 
to disclose throughout the Class Period each time they spoke 
about the Phase 2 interim results or the decision to initiate the 
Phase 3 trial to avoid misleading disclosures.  See Oran, 226 
F.3d at 285–86.  The Funds contend because defendants 
previously told the market the interim results would need to 
be “spectacular” to justify early initiation of Phase 3, 
defendants had an ongoing duty to disclose that the interim 
results were not supportive of the move to Phase 3.  We 
conclude the District Court properly refused to find 
defendants had an ongoing duty to disclose. 
 
As noted above, the course of events outlined in 
Ruffolo’s October 2006 “spectacular” statement did not come 
to pass.  The companies only advanced to Phase 3 in the 
second half of 2007, not in the first half of 2007 as Ruffolo 
had said they might if the interim results proved to be 
“spectacular.”  Accordingly, defendants had no duty to update 
33 
 
the “spectacular” statement.  See United States v. Schiff, 602 
F.3d 152, 170 (3d Cir. 2010); Oran, 226 F.3d at 286.  
Moreover, we have held that a duty to update applies only in 
“narrow circumstances” involving more fundamental 
corporate changes such as mergers, takeovers, or liquidations, 
as well as when subsequent events produce an “extreme” or 
“radical change” in the continuing validity of the original 
statement.  See Schiff, 602 F.3d at 170 (citing In re Burlington 
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1433–34 (3d Cir. 
1997)).  Those elements are not present here.  Furthermore, 
there is no duty to update vague and general statements such 
as “spectacular.”  See In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 538 
(“[V]ague and general statements of optimism constitute no 
more than puffery and are understood by reasonable investors 
as such.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); 
Philco Invs., Ltd. v. Martin, No. 10-02785, 2011 WL 500694, 
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2011). 
 
Even if we determined defendants had a duty to update 
the October 2006 “spectacular” statement, the May 2007 
Release would have cut off any such duty.  Its explicit caution 
that investors should draw no conclusion about the Phase 2 
interim results tempered any impression made by the 
“spectacular” statement.  Had the Phase 2 interim results been 
spectacular, it is reasonable to assume Wyeth would have 
trumpeted that fact. 
 
Accordingly, defendants were under no duty to 
disclose the allegedly omitted information. 
 
IV. 
The Funds also appeal the District Court’s dismissal of 
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their control person liability and insider trading claims.  We 
conclude the District Court correctly dismissed those claims 
for failure to adequately plead a predicate Exchange Act 
violation. 
 
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act creates a cause of 
action against individuals who exercise control over a 
“controlled person,” including a corporation, who has 
committed a section 10(b) violation.  15 U.S.C. § 78t(a); see 
also Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 
252 (3d Cir. 2009).  Because the Funds have failed to 
adequately plead a predicate section 10(b) violation, their 
section 20(a) claim must be dismissed.  See Rahman v. Kid 
Brands, Inc., 736 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 
Institutional Investors Grp., 564 F.3d at 252). 
 
Similarly, section 20A of the Exchange Act provides 
that a corporate insider who trades stock “while in possession 
of material, nonpublic information” is liable to any person 
who traded contemporaneously with the insider, provided 
there is an independent Exchange Act violation.  15 U.S.C. § 
78t-1(a).  Because the Funds have failed to adequately plead a 
predicate Exchange Act violation, their section 20A claim 
must also be dismissed.  See In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 541 
(citations omitted); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 60 F. Supp. 2d 
354, 378 (D.N.J. 1999).16 
                                              
16 The Funds also allege the District Court erred in relying on 
two other bases to dismiss their section 10(b) claims—the 
May 2007 Release’s use of cautionary language and the 
District Court’s purported finding that the May 2007 Release 
statement was immaterial.   The Funds contend the District 
Court misapplied either the PSLRA Safe Harbor provision, 15 
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V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court granting defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss. 
                                                                                                     
U.S.C. § 78u-5(c), or the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, EP 
Medsystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865, 873 (3d 
Cir. 2010), in finding the May 2007 Release statement to be 
cautious.  But the District Court applied neither doctrine and 
only invoked defendants’ use of cautionary language in 
analyzing whether the plain language of the May 2007 
Release was false or misleading.  Nor did the District Court 
make any findings on materiality—the court based its ruling 
on the Funds’ failure to plead falsity, not on the materiality of 
the statements.  Accordingly, the Funds’ contentions the 
District Court erred in relying on the May 2007 Release’s 
cautionary language and in making materiality determinations 
lack merit. 
